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Subject:Re: A320 Crash
From:Phil Miller
Date:Thu Aug 24 19:28:29 2000
On Thu, 24 Aug 2000 11:48:18 -0600, Razor
wrote:

>Regarding the Habsheim incident:
>
>While it was called pilot error, one could argue that the pilot was led into a trap by the A320 designers.

Wrong. See below.

>He was an Airbus test pilot, not a commercial pilot.

Wrong. See below.

>He pushed the throttles forward while doing a low approach to go around. The computer was in land mode, and did not respond to the throttle input.

Wrong. See below.

>Because the throttles are not back driven by the autothrottle on the A320, the throttles stayed where he put them, but did NOTHING to the engine power setting. Since the throttles did not move to the position the computer was commanding (like they do on the Boeing models), the pilot took a while to realize that the engines were not spooling up. Once he realized the problem, he pushed the TOGA button to command the computer to do a go-around. By this time, it was too late. The engines could not spool up fast enough, and he sank into the trees at the end of the runway.

Wrong. See below.

>The A320 flight deck does not have the best man-machine interface in the aviation world IMHO.

IYHO. Wrong about the rest. Probably wrong about this too.

>Regardless, I do agree that there is no data yet on what caused the crash in Bahrain, and speculation at this point is worthless.

Well. One correct comment. Not a total waste of bandwidth after all.

I posted this to the group on 12/12/1999

----------------------------------------------------------------------

This crash is covered in Macarthur Jobs book "Air Disaster Volume 3",
chapter 1.

Some of the findings of the investigation listed in the book are:

"...Throughout the descent, the engines were throttled back to flight idle
with the speed reducing."

"At 100ft AGL, the descent rate was still about 600fpm."

"The captain levelled off at a height of about 30ft, engines at flight
idle, attitude increasing."

"Full power was rapidly applied when the angle of attack was 15deg and the
speed 122 knots."

"The response of the engines was normal and in compliance with their
certification."

"The accident resulted from a combination of the following: - flyover
height lower than surrounding obstacles;
- slow speed, reducing to reach maximum angle of attack;
- engines at flight idle;
- late application of go around power."

Descending at 600fpm at 100ft. Levelling off at 30ft, with the engines at
flight idle. Would anything bigger than an Auster climb over the trees?

These books are an excellent read.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

And in response to another poster.....

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Not so much forgot as never knew. In my last post I tried not to quote too
much from Macarthur Jobs book, but below is a bit more. I suggested
reading the book. There are 13 pages on this accident, including maps and
partial CVR transcripts.


From "Air Disaster Volume 3" by Macarthur Job

"...Because of the extensive and diverse experience of the two pilots, the
Flight Division [of Air France] did not consider making any reconnaissance
of the Habsheim aerodrome in preparation for the display flight.

"...Captain Asseline was away from Paris taking delivery of the aircraft on
the Friday, and was engaged in A320 crew training on the Saturday, while
Captain Mazieres was off duty until Sunday. The two pilots thus obtained
details of the operation only when they were handed the company file on the
airshow request after reporting for duty at Charles de Gaulle Airport on
the morning of the flight. Even then they were given no verbal briefing on
the flyover, or on the details of the aerodrome at which it was being held.

"...As set out in the crew instructions............make a low pass at low
speed over Habsheims runway 02.....

"...Neither pilot was familiar with Habsheim aerodrome or even its precise
position, except what they had gleaned from their charts.

"...at a height of only 450ft, the captain saw from the alignment of the
airshow crowd that the axis of the flying display was not along Runway 02
as he had expected, but along a grass airstrip aligned northeast [34]. As
the aircraft neared the airfield therefore, he gently banked to the right
to re-align its ground track accordingly.

"...At this stage the crew deactivated the Alpha Floor function, to prevent
the computerised control system from automatically applying power as the
angle of attack increased.

"...A forest of young oak and birch trees... begins only 60m from the
northwest end of Habsheims grass strip 34R.

"The airshows invitation to conduct the low level flyovers at Habsheim
aerodrome in the A320 had been studied by the relevant departments within
Air France... These studies in the main consisted of checking obstacle
clearances in the case of an engine failure, and were carried out with
reference to Habsheims Runway 02/20, over which it was understood that the
flyover would be made.

"Although French air safety regulations officially required aircraft making
such flyovers to maintain a minimum height of 170ft AGL in VFR conditions,
it had long been the practice within Air France to conduct tourist and
demonstration flights at airshows down to minimum altitudes of 100ft.

"...In this case it is evident that the aircrafts descent towards Habsheim
aerodrome and its positioning for the flyover was conducted with haste and
without time to properly stabilise the descent, or to position the aircraft
at the correct height, airspeed and power setting. It was also evident that
task-sharing by the crew during this time was not as planned.

"The aircrafts takeoff and climb to 2000 feet on QNH lasted two minutes
during which both pilots were occupied with management of the flight. Only
at this stage were they able to begin locating and identifying Habsheim
aerodrome, which was unfamiliar to them both. As a result, the descent
towards the aerodrome only began when the aircraft was less than six
nautical miles from the field. This distance was insufficient to both lose
height and decelerate in time to stabilise the aircraft at the planned
flyover speed and height before reaching the airfield.

[The total flight time was 4 minutes and 34 seconds]

-------
Phil _--_|\
philmil@bigpond.com / \
New South Wales \_.--._*
Australia


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